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Transition from socialism to a free market economy has involved decen-
tralization of both the economy and the government. Moreover, these
two aspects seem to be highly interdependent so that a setback in either
one can stall the whole process of reforms. A striking example of how
decentralization of government can interfere with economic reforms is
presented in the Russian experience of reducing budgetary subsidies to
enterprises. Democratic elections at all levels of government replaced
the communist party appointees with public officials accountable to the
constituency. The newly empowered subnational leaders started to claim
their share of what used to be a centralized pool of fiscal resources by
capturing local offices of the revenue service. Trying to balance its fiscal
accounts, the central government responded by "off-loading" expendi-
ture responsibilities to the subnational level.
One of the expenditure items shifted down to subnational governments
was budgetary subsidies that used to play a key role in bridging centrally
set prices with enterprise specific costs. Liberalization policies during
transition allowed prices to rise toward market clearing levels thus
reducing the extent of subsidization. Yet, in some sectors subsidies as-
sociated with price-controls remained due to social and political factors.
The central government discontinued providing subsidies from the
federal budget while delegating the discretion to regulate prices to the
subnational governments. Yet, due to their proximity to the constituency,
subnational leaders appear to be more sensitive to the political factors of
subsidization. Thus, they were quick to fill in the gap left by the central
government. Hence, the central government solved its short-run fiscal
imbalance at the expense of losing control of further price liberalization.
There are no counterfactual data to test the hypothesis that elimination
of budgetary subsidies would have been more successful in Russia had
the public sector remained centralized. However, I can approach this hy-
pothesis indirectly by exploring the intra-regional decentralization that
occurred. With the tradition of looking to higher authorities for guide-
lines, regional governments often mimic the federal-regional relationship
when dealing with constituent localities. Thus off-loading responsibilities
for price subsidies trickled down to the local level. As federal legislation
leaves regional-local relationships completely to the discretion of re-
gional governments, there is a significant variation across regions in the
decentralization of both expenditure responsibilities and revenue-raising
authority. At the same time the extent of government subsidies to enter-
prises also varies widely from region to region.
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This paper aims to explore the link between the degree of fiscal decen-
tralization and the extent of subsidization in Russian regions. A theoreti-
cal model establishes that for any given local share in total regional-local
expenditures, decentralization of revenue-raising authority makes local
governments reallocate funds from subsidies to more productive uses
like public infrastructure. The intuition is that stronger reliance on reve-
nues drawn from the local economic base increases the local govern-
ment's opportunity costs of unproductive expenditures.
This theoretic prediction is tested on a panel of data for Russian regions
in 1995 – 1997. The analysis yields positive estimates for the effect of an
increase in the amount of resources available to local governments on
the amount of budgetary subsidies. However, the effect of substituting a
share of locally collected taxes for an equivalent amount of grants from
the regional government reduces the amount of local subsides. Thus, tax
instruments appear to be a superior form of financing decentralized ex-
penditures than intergovernmental transfers. Similar results are obtained
when the measure of subsidization includes tolerated tax arrears in addi-
tion to direct budgetary outlays on subsidies. The robustness of the re-
sults is secured by employing different econometric specifications for the
region- and time-specific effects. Moreover, explicit treatment for possi-




Transition from socialism to capitalism has involved decentralization of
both the economy and the government. Under the socialist system, the
key role in linking discrepancies between centrally set prices and enter-
prise-specific costs was played by budgetary subsidies and turnover
taxes. Liberalization polices initiated by central governments allowed
prices to rise toward market clearing levels, which was accompanied by
a mass reduction of central subsidies. However, in some sectors of the
economy price controls have remained due to "social" and "political"
factors (Schaffer, 1995). Moreover in multi-tier governments, subnational
levels seem to be more sensitive to these factors because of their
proximity to the constituency.1 Hence, devolution of powers to the sub-
national level can hamper the elimination of the remaining subsidies.
A striking example of how decentralization of the government can inter-
fere with market reforms is presented in the Russian transition experi-
ence. Tremendous regulatory and fiscal powers have been devolved to
the regional and local governments in Russia (Shleifer, 1997). This has
left the federal government with limited leverage on subnational2 deci-
sion-making, which in turn resulted in a variety of economic policies pur-
sued by different regions. Thus, in 1997 there was a tenfold difference
between regions in the degree of subsidization via direct budgetary
transfers to enterprises. At the same time, regional authorities have had
full discretion in determining their fiscal relationships with constituent lo-
calities. Hence, the division of responsibilities for the functions shared
between the two subnational levels of government also differed consid-
erably from region to region.
                                               
1 Some evidence on the Russian Federation is provided by Mau and Stupin (1997)
and the McKinsey Global Institute (1999). Mau and Stupin point out that subna-
tional governments might be more dependent on their enterprises, especially on
those providing regional employment, budget revenues, hard currency receipts,
and social safety nets, and hence have less political resources to revise the prac-
tices of subsidizing the regional economy. The McKinsey Global Institute Report
finds that restrictions on labor mobility combined with the fact that upper-level
governments are not paying enough unemployment benefits prompt local gov-
ernments to oppose restructuring and to subsidize their local firms.
2 The term "subnational" refers to all levels below the federal or central level. For
Russia I will distinguish the "regional level," referring to the 89 subjects of the
Russian Federation (ethnic republics, krais, okrugs, oblasts, and autonomous ar-
eas) and the "local level," referring to cities and rayons and smaller entities.
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This research aims to examine the link between fiscal decentralization
and government support to enterprises at the subnational level. A styl-
ized model of the interaction between regional and local governments
demonstrates the importance of fiscal incentives embedded into the in-
tergovernmental fiscal arrangements. The model traces the link between
fiscal decentralization and the propensity of local governments to subsi-
dize enterprises. The presence of this link is tested on a panel of 72
Russian regions over the period 1995 – 1997.
Beside direct budgetary subsidies there are also several channels of
hidden government support to enterprises (tax benefits, preferential
credits, tax exemptions, tax off-sets, tolerated tax arrears and others).
However, inspection of the data shows that at the subnational level the
flow of direct budgetary subsidies, on average at 6% of the Regional
Economic Product, is much larger than the flow of tax arrears. Besides,
direct budgetary subsidies are mostly sector specific and relate primarily
to remaining price regulations, e.g., residential utilities. Unfortunately,
the gap-filling nature of such subsidies, allocated ex post as compensa-
tion to enterprises for losses attributed to price controls, creates a moral
hazard on the part of the enterprises. Besides softening budget con-
straints3 of affected enterprises, subsidies have been primarily contrib-
uting to fiscal imbalances but now at the subnational level.
The lack of counterfactual experience at the federal level does not allow
one to directly test the hypothesis that Russia would have been more
successful in eliminating budgetary subsidies and adjusting its fiscal ac-
counts had the central government preserved control over the whole
public sector. However, investigating the relationship between fiscal de-
centralization within Russian regions and the extent of subsidization from
subnational budgets can give us some insights into this issue. The re-
gional experience is highly relevant for answering this question because,
regional governments, in their relationship with constituent localities, of-
ten mimic the federal government's relationship with the regions.
Starting in late 1997, the federal government has tried to pursue an ex-
pansive agenda for reforms aimed at bringing some structure to the in-
tra-regional systems of fiscal relations. The results of my analysis should
provide the reformers with some guidance as to the impact of fiscal re-
forms on the degree of subsidization of a regional economy. More spe-
                                               
3 The notion of hard budget constraints originates with Kornai (1980) and indi-
cates financial independence of enterprises from the government. Kornai argues
that poor enterprise performance in socialist economies was associated with soft-
budget constraints, that is, managers' knowledge that their losses would probably
be covered by the authorities whatever their own performance was.
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cifically, the analysis assesses the impact of decentralization of the reve-
nue raising authority within regions on the extent of subsidization of the
regional economy given the existing separation of functions between re-
gional and local governments. This could guide new legislation aimed at
reaching a clearer separation of expenditure responsibilities for shared
functions if promotion of restructuring at the regional level is concerned.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the evolution of intergovernmental fiscal relations during the Russian
transition. Section 3 demonstrates the scale and incidence of govern-
ment support to enterprises at the subnational level in Russia. Section 4
develops a stylized model of interaction between regional and local gov-
ernments and explores the impact of decentralization on subnational
subsidies. Section 5 describes the data, states the research hypothesis
and specifies an empirical strategy. Section 6 presents empirical evi-
dence on the effects of fiscal decentralization on the local governments'
propensity to subsidize enterprises in Russian regions. My conclusions
and policy implications follow.
2. INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS IN RUSSIA
The Russian system of government dates back to the mid-eighties, when
Michael Gorbachev launched his Perestroika initiative. By the late eight-
ies, the former legislatures (Soviets of Deputies) were transformed into
representative forums in which deputies were elected at all levels in fair
multi-candidate polls. After the 1993 standoff between the President and
the Supreme Soviet, executive heads started to be elected directly4 and
thus they gained some autonomy from the legislature. Overall, Russian
reforms of intergovernmental fiscal relations have lacked consistency
due to an ongoing compromise between intended changes and various
stakeholders' opposition.5 Three main phases are distinguished in the lit-
erature: 1992 – 1993, 1994 – 1997, and the recent set of reforms intro-
duced in 1997.
The 1992 – 1993 period was basically a continuation of the old Soviet
system with a few changes. The most important change was shifting
major expenditure responsibilities down to subnational governments.
                                               
4 The Law on Appointment and Dismissal of Heads of Krai, Oblast, Autonomous
Oblast, Autonomous Okrug, Rayon, Town, Urban Rayon, Settlement, and Rural
Administrations of 1993
5 For a thorough overview, see Martinez-Vazquez and Boex (2001), Wallich
(1994), and Zhuravskaya (2000).
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These expenditures included capital investments in many areas, social
welfare, and price subsidies for social goods like food, medicine, local
transportation, and public utilities.6 At the same time regional and local
governments were given little revenue-raising authority. Subnational
revenues were drawn primarily from shared taxes and intergovernmental
fiscal transfers in the form of negotiated "subventions." The center ar-
gued that due to fiscal pressures, it couldn't cede to subnational level
control over any of the major tax bases.
Initially the 1991 Law on the Basic Principles of Taxation decreed federal
personal and corporate income taxes to be shared with subnational
budgets and the revenue from the value added tax to be entirely allo-
cated to the federal budget. However, as the tax administration was very
weak institutionally and often dominated by local authorities, secure pro-
ceeds from the VAT immediately became subject to sharing. As a result,
subnational governments gained access to productive and elastic reve-
nue bases but had little say in determining tax rates or tax bases. In
1993 the federal government gave subnational governments carte
blanche to introduce new taxes. This freedom resulted in a plethora of
minor taxes and nuisance charges that were abolished with the restora-
tion of the federal list of allowed taxes in 1996.
In 1994 important reforms were undertaken in the system of fiscal rela-
tions between the federal government and regions. The budgetary
autonomy of subnational governments had been strengthened with the
introduction of the 1993 Constitution. Also, the federal government
stopped the ad hoc "off-loading" of expenditure responsibilities to re-
gional and local governments. However, the federal government contin-
ued the practice of unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
Rates of sharing the major taxes between the federal government and
regional governments were standardized across all regions. In addition,
regional governments' share of revenue from the federal tax on enter-
prise profits was turned into a piggyback regional tax with a rate of up to
22 percent. The unification of tax-sharing rates across regions was offset
                                               
6 This "off-loading" was closely linked to privatization. In the Soviet system, cen-
trally planned enterprises were responsible for the provision of many basic goods
and services. Hence, before being privatized such enterprises maintained huge
social assets: housing, kindergartens, hospitals, and recreation facilities. Privatiza-
tion was accompanied by the process of divestiture, meaning a transfer of social
assets and the responsibility for their financing to municipalities. In fact, enter-
prises faced a choice either to maintain the infrastructure and partially off-set li-
abilities from the Housing Maintenance Tax, which is 1.5% of enterprise turnover,
by the amount of expenses incurred or divest and pay the turnover tax in full (Alm
and Sjoquist, 1995; Commander and Schankerman, 1997).
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with the introduction of a formula-driven mechanism of equalization
transfers. In addition, the federal government maintained the ad hoc
mechanism of "mutual settlements."7
Since the end of 1997 the federal government has tried to pursue an ex-
pansive agenda for reform stated in the Concept of Reform of Intergov-
ernmental Fiscal Relations in the Russian Federation. The Concept calls
for a fundamental change in the system of federal transfers and also for
bringing some structure to the intra-regional systems of fiscal relations.
While the inter-budgetary relationships between the federal government
and the regions are defined more or less clearly in the constitution,8 the
relationships between the regional governments and constituent localities
are left to the discretion of regional authorities. Hence, the division of re-
sponsibilities for the functions shared between the two subnational levels
of government considerably differs from region to region.
Before proceeding to the empirical evidence on fiscal decentralization in
Russian regions, I would like to summarize numerous discussions on the
definition and empirical measurements of this subject. Public finance
economists define decentralization as the process of empowering local
government units with some autonomy in decision-making. Three forms
of this process have been distinguished in the literature: deconcentra-
tion, delegation, and devolution (See Bird, 1993; Bird and Vaillancourt,
1998; and Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 1998). Through deconcentra-
tion the central government gives some autonomy to its local offices that
are appointed by and accountable to the higher hierarchy. Under dele-
gation locally elected government bodies assume new responsibilities
subject to strict regulations by the upper-level government. The process
of devolution establishes complete autonomy of locally elected govern-
ment bodies in their exclusive spheres of responsibility.
According to these definitions, the evolution of intergovernmental rela-
tions in Russia presents a mix of delegation and devolution. Devolution is
                                               
7 These are non-budgeted and primarily negotiated funds that are made public
after budget execution. A great deal of these are in the form of tax exemptions
from federal taxes available to regional energy suppliers. Regional administrations
trade these exemptions for the bills of exchange issued by regional utility suppli-
ers. The bills of exchange are transferred to local governments under the mutual
settlements account so that localities can cover overdue payables to energy sup-
pliers.
8 Articles 71 and 72 assigned expenditure responsibilities between the Federation
and regional governments with great ambiguity that was tried to be resolved
through subsequent federal laws or bilateral fiscal treaties between the federal
government and individual regions.
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more prominent in the federal-regional sector. For instance, regional
governments are solely responsible for financing public transportation
and fire protection. However, in the regional-local sector many functions
are shared between the two levels of government without a clear division
of responsibilities. Restricted in the ability to structure their own revenue
systems, local governments depend on the revenue decisions of the re-
gional government. Thus, localities receive funding which is just enough
to cover expenditures approved by the upper-level government. This lim-
its local government's autonomy and undermines its accountability to the
constituency.
The definition of decentralization suggests that it is a multi-faceted proc-
ess. At least three distinct characteristics jointly constitute this concept:
authority, autonomy, and accountability. Thus, no single-dimensional
measure can capture the true degree of decentralization. Some ap-
proaches to measuring the extent of fiscal decentralization have been
suggested in recent empirical studies on the link between fiscal federal-
ism and economic development.9 The suggested measures capture
three essential aspects of decentralization: participatory allocation, stra-
tegic interaction, and fiscal incentives.
The first aspect relates to the share of general public spending that falls
under the authority of local governments, and is therefore subject to the
merits and dangers of decentralized decision-making. This aspect can
be measured as a ratio of subnational government spending to general
government spending. However, such a ratio can be misleading if local
governments act simply as spending agents of the upper-level govern-
ments and are constrained by mandates imposed on them.
The second aspect of decentralization concerns the number of parties
involved in the decision-making process. All other things being equal,
more local governments (more fragmentation) would imply higher fiscal
decentralization. This can have several interpretations: degrees of free-
dom for tailoring public goods to heterogeneous preferences; intensity of
competition among jurisdictions; opportunities to negotiate a deal in-
volving several bureaucracies; etc. This aspect is also connected to dis-
economy of scale, inter-jurisdictional disparities and moral hazards on
the part of localities.
                                               
9 For a thorough discussion see Bahl and Linn (1992) and Guess et al. (1997).
Econometric applications can be found in Davoodi and Zou (1998), Huther and
Shah (1998), Jin et al. (1999), Woller and Phillips (1998), and Zhang and Zou
(1998).
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The third aspect of decentralization relates to local governments' feed-
back through local revenues.10 This can be measured as the elasticity of
local revenues with respect to the local economic base. Alternatively it
could be measured as the share of local revenues that is drawn from the
local economic base (as opposed to intergovernmental transfers). This
measure should capture the incentives of local government to promote
development or to cap spending. A dynamic generalization of this meas-
ure captures the ratchet effect that is off-setting an increase in localities'
own revenues with a decrease in grants.
In the Russian context, measuring fiscal incentives boils down to an as-
sessment of the revenue-sharing scheme. Federal tax legislation does
not allow subnational governments to introduce taxes on any significant
revenue base. The only exception is the property tax, which has sub-
stantial administration costs if it is to generate adequate tax revenues.
Unfortunately, in Russia, all tax payments to all levels of government are
collected by the federal tax service,11 which has no incentives to invest in
the administration of local taxes. Thus, the bulk of subnational revenues
comes from shared taxes, either through tax revenue retention at the
point of collection or through redistribution via intergovernmental fiscal
flows.
In this paper I measure fiscal incentives by using the retention rate of tax
collections in localities by local governments.12 On the one hand, this
measure indirectly indicates the share of local spending that is tied to
the local revenue base as opposed to the share of expenditures funded
with intergovernmental transfers and thus effectively subsidized by other
localities. On the other hand, this measure captures the magnitude of
opportunity costs incurred by local governments as a result of interven-
tionist policies that retard development. This is a core feature of this pa-
per and thus should be emphasized. Any non-zero tax revenue retention
rate implies strictly positive elasticity of local revenues with respect to
                                               
10 Often this aspect of decentralization is referred to as "enabling markets and
fiscal instruments to hold local officials accountable" (e.g., Ahmad, 1997).
11 In all localities, tax payments to all levels of government are collected by a local
branch of the federal tax service. Then proceeds from taxes assigned exclusively
to localities and regions are transferred to an appropriate budget while exclusive
federal and shared tax revenue is transferred to a local branch of the federal
treasury. It is the local treasury office that splits the shared tax revenue between
the budgets of the different levels of government according to fixed sharing rates.
This way the federal government keeps track of all collections from every region
and their allocation to all levels of governments.
12 This measurement of regional-local sharing excludes tax collections remitted to
the federal budget.
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the local economic base (provided that an increase in the tax base is not
entirely offset by a decrease in grants). However, higher rates of tax
revenue retention imply higher losses to local governments resulting
from the same loss in economic activity.
Below I use some modifications of the empirical measures described
above in order to illustrate the development of fiscal decentralization in
Russian regions from 1992 – 1997. Table 1 shows the local govern-
ment's share in consolidated regional-local expenditures. The mean
share of local governments in consolidated regional expenditures was
stable at the level of about 64 percent. However, there were wide varia-
tions among regions that persisted throughout these years. In 1997, for
example, local government spending in the Nenets Autonomous Area
accounted for only 29 percent of total regional-local expenditures in
contrast to the Perm Oblast, where local government spending was 85
percent.
Table 1. Local Government's Share in Consolidated Regional-Local Expenditures,
1992 – 1997.
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Mean 63% 63% 63% 64% 66% 64%
Median 65% 66% 64% 67% 69% 67%
Max 100% 100% 100% 84% 87% 85%
Min 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Coefficient of Variation 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.24
Source: Calculated from Russian Ministry of Finance data.
Note: The maximum of 100% is observed in the Ingush Republic and Ust-Orda Buriat
Autonomous Okrug as a result of no regional expenditures.
Table 2 reveals that the local government's share in consolidated re-
gional collections was less stable than its share in consolidated regional
expenditures. The mean/media share of local government's collections
exhibits two jumps. In 1994 the mean share of local government's col-
lections in consolidated regional collections increased from 45 percent
to 60 percent. That year the share of local government's collections in
GDP was also at its decade maximum of 7 percent (Table 3). A smaller
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jump can be identified in 1996, when the median share of local govern-
ment in consolidated regional collections increased to 63 percent.
Table 2. Local Government's Share in Consolidated Regional-Local Revenues
from Own and Assigned Sources, 1992 – 1997.
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Mean 48% 45% 60% 59% 63% 61%
Median 51% 47% 59% 59% 64% 63%
Max 79% 100% 100% 94% 94% 93%
Min 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Coefficient of Variation 0.34 0.39 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.26
Source: Calculated from Russian Ministry of Finance data.
Note: The maximum of 100% is observed in the Ust-Orda Buriat Autonomous Okrug as a re-
sult of no regional collections.
Table 3. Distribution of Pre-Transfer Revenues between Levels of Government,
1992 – 1997 (% of GDP).
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Regional Budgets 7.0% 9.0% 7.7% 7.3% 6.5% 7.8%
Local Budgets 6.2% 6.9% 7.0% 6.3% 6.4% 6.9%
Total Subnational 13.1% 15.9% 14.7% 13.6% 12.9% 14.7%
Source: Calculated from Russian Ministry of Finance data.
Although the two jumps narrowed the discrepancy between the local
government's share in consolidated regional revenues and its share in
consolidated regional expenditures, it does not necessary mean an im-
provement in the vertical fiscal balance at the local level. A significant
portion of consolidated regional expenditures is funded with federal
grants. Thus, even if consolidated regional collections are allocated be-
tween the regional and local governments in correspondence with their
expenditure responsibilities, local government's fiscal accounts can still
be unbalanced unless an adequate share of federal grants is passed on
by the regional government to localities.
Presented indicators of fiscal decentralization show that as of 1997, on
average, 64 percent of subnational expenditures are carried out by local
governments. At the same time only 61 percent of subnational tax col-
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lections are directly assigned to local governments. The gap is filled with
intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Moreover, a tremendous variation in
both the aspects of decentralization across regions persists throughout
the years
3. SUBNATIONAL SUBSIDIES
In general terms a subsidy can be defined as a government intervention
that reduces the price paid by a consumer below what it would be oth-
erwise (a consumer subsidy) or increases the price received by a pro-
ducer above the market level (a producer subsidy).13 In socialist econo-
mies, government transfers to enterprises constituted a key element of
the price administration system, bridging centrally set prices and enter-
prise-specific costs. However, these interventions might not fit the defi-
nition provided above. There were no market prices in socialist econo-
mies, and thus financial transfers to enterprises were only altering
artificially set prices.
However, after the economy had been liberalized, residual transfers from
the government became an obstacle to the efficient allocation of re-
sources as determined by market forces. Moreover, as Soviet firms pro-
vided higher shares of social benefits in labor compensation compared
to other countries of Eastern and Central Europe, Russia inherited more
subsidization of the economy in the start of transition (Balcerowicz and
Gelb, 1994; Commander and Schankerman, 1997; Shaffer, 1995). The
policy of price liberalization let prices rise to market-clearing levels re-
sulting in dramatic cuts in subsidies (see Table 4). However, as prices
rose and central subsidies decreased, subnational governments often
intervened for "social" or "political" reasons.14
                                               
13 For a discussion on the definition and measurement of government subsidies,
see Schwartz and Clements (1999).
14 In the short run, there might have been an economic rationale for these inter-
ventions. Commander and Schankerman (1997) argue that the divestiture of so-
cial assets by enterprises might result in "under-consumption of merit goods
arising from the lagged wage adjustment" after removing social benefits from the
total labor compensation. This prompts a transitional system of income support.
However, if ill-designed, this income support program can have disastrous fiscal
consequences. First, if income redistribution is not managed by the center, it is
likely to cause greater inter-regional inequality as poor localities scare off busi-
nesses with the excessive fiscal burden of the program while fiscally rich localities
(e.g. oil-rich) exploit their pecuniary fiscal advantage. Additional inefficiency might
result from neglecting the incentive issues in either the supply or demand for the
concerned benefits.
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Table 4. Government Support to Enterprises in Russia, 1992 – 1997 (% of GDP).
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Direct subsidies
from the federal budget
5.8% 2.5% 3.1% 2.2% 1.6% 1.8%
Flow of tax arrears
to the federal budget
n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.44% 1.82% 1.31%
Direct subsidies
from subnational budgets
5.3% 6.8% 7.3% 5.2% 6.3% 6.9%
Flow of tax arrears
to subnational budgets
n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.27% 1.51% 0.81%
Source: Russian Statistical Yearbook, 1998.
Note: Here tax arrears include rescheduled payables.
The central government's strategy was to reduce the fiscal deficit by dis-
continuing financial transfers to enterprises from the center. In 1992,
total government support to enterprises amounted to 30 percent of GDP
(Alfandari et al., 1996). Based on a representative survey of enterprises
in 1992 – 1994, the authors found that only 15 – 25 percent of this
amount took the form of direct budgetary subsidies and investment
grants (see Table 4). The largest share, over one third, was constituted
by directed credits to enterprises from the central bank. Until the end of
1994, the central bank was providing directed credits to industry, argu-
ing that tight money would leave enterprises without working capital. The
second largest form of government support in Alfandari et al.'s survey
was presented as tax benefits accounting for 16 – 34 percent of the to-
tal. The rest of the subsidies were made up by transfers from sectoral
extra-budgetary (ministerial) funds.
In autumn 1993, the central government took drastic measures to re-
duce subsidization of the economy. The central bank was instructed to
phase out the directed credits to enterprises. At the same time individual
tax benefits to enterprises were revised. Price subsidies were signifi-
cantly reduced at the federal level, while the right to maintain subsidies
was delegated to subnational governments. However, the reduction of
explicit transfers to enterprises was accompanied by the development of
implicit subsidization. In a recent World Bank study (Pinto et al., 2000), it
is estimated that implicit subsidies from the general government grew to
over 6 percent of GDP in 1998 from below 4 percent in 1994. About 70
percent of the implicit subsidies are accounted for by tax arrears and 30
percent are made up by inflated prices in tax off-sets and government
procurements. At the subnational level, inflated prices used in govern-
ment procurement accounted for more than 50 percent of all implicit
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subsidies. Commander et al. (2000) present clear evidence that local
governments engage in non-monetary transactions primarily with loss-
making enterprises. By contrast, the federal government seems to ac-
cept in-kind tax payments even from solvent enterprises.
The decentralization of 1992 – 1997 left the federal government with
limited leverage on subnational decision-making, which in turn resulted
in differing economic policies pursued by different regions. In particular,
many regions resumed price controls and regulations. Some regions
even resorted to such discriminatory practices as forced distribution of
production at the local level. Thus, the central government solved the
short-run fiscal problem at the expense of losing control over further lib-
eralization of the economy.
As a result, the extent of enterprise subsidization from subnational budg-
ets varied significantly among regions (Freinkman et al., 1998). Empiri-
cally, the degree of subsidization can be measured as a ratio of gross
budgetary outlays on subsidies15 to the total budget expenditures or to
the size of regional economic product (see Table 5). As of 1997 there
was a tenfold difference between regions in the degree of subsidization
via direct budgetary transfers to enterprises. Subsidization via tolerated
tax arrears16 varied even more substantially. Ideally a measure of sub-
sidization should include all channels of government support, including
tax benefits, preferential credits, tax exemptions and tolerated tax ar-
rears in addition to direct budgetary subsidies. However, as Pinto et al.'s
(2000) study and Table 4 suggest, direct budgetary subsides constituted
the major form of government support at the subnational level.
The direct budgetary subsidies developed at the subnational level are for
the most part very sector specific. Table 6 presents more detailed data
on the sectoral distribution of the direct budgetary transfers to enter-
prises. Sectors that continue to receive substantial subsidies are resi-
dential utilities (in particular, central heating), transportation, and agri-
culture.17 Thus, the bulk of the direct budgetary subsidies can be
                                               
15 In this paper, data on explicit budgetary subsidies are taken from reports on
the execution of subnational budgets, which are filled out according to the budget
classification introduced by the federal Ministry of Finance. The classification fol-
lows the United Nations' System of National Accounts (SNA) that defines subsi-
dies as "current unrequited government payments to enterprises on the basis of
their production, sales, or imports."
16 Due to the lack of data, in this paper I consider only overdue tax arrears thus
ignoring tax liabilities that have been rescheduled, written off or offset.
17 Subsidies to different sectors of the economy are provided by different levels of
government. Regional governments are responsible for agriculture, manufactur-
ing, and inter-city transportation while localities subsidize housing, public utilities,
and city transportation.
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Table 5. Summary of Subnational Subsidization Indicators, 1995 – 1997.
1995 1996 1997
Subnational budgetary subsidies as a share
of consolidated regional expenditures
Mean 10% 19% 28%
Median 8% 19% 28%
Max 36% 48% 52%
Min 0% 0% 5%
Coefficient of Variation 1.03 0.57 0.33
Flow of tax arrears to subnational budgets as a share
of consolidated regional expenditures
Mean 6.1% 3.6% 6.4%
Median 5.1% 3.1% 5.2%
Max 17.7% 13.7% 30.7%
Min 0.4% –2.6% 0.6%
Coefficient of Variation 0.97 1.41 0.78
Subnational budgetary subsidies as a share
of Regional Economic Product
Mean 2.0% 4.1% 6.8%
Median 1.4% 3.8% 6.4%
Max 15.3% 17.8% 22.1%
Min 0.0% 0.0% 2.1%
Coefficient of Variation 1.19 0.70 0.45
Flow of tax arrears to subnational budgets as a share
of Regional Economic Product
Mean 1.15% 0.71% 1.41%
Median 0.94% 0.57% 1.24%
Max 3.09% 2.57% 5.99%
Min 0.28% –0.65% 0.19%
Coefficient of Variation 0.60 0.76 0.66
Source: Calculated from Russian Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Taxation data.
Notes: 1) These descriptive statistics are calculated over a sample excluding sixteen out of
eighty-eight regions. These excluded regions are nine autonomous areas18 and seven oblasts
(the equivalent of a state) within whose boundaries these autonomous areas are located. The
reason is that the official statistics report the overall economic product produced within the
boundaries of an oblast thus making it impossible to split the economic product among inde-
pendent regions located one inside another; 2) Here tax arrears exclude rescheduled pay-
ables to subnational budgets.
                                               
18 As equal subjects of the Russian Federation, the autonomous areas are inde-
pendent from surrounding oblasts and have their own representative and execu-
tive branches of regional government, budgets and systems of local self-
government.
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Table 6. Sectoral Distribution of Subnational Budgetary Subsidies (% of total
subsidies), 1995 – 1997.
Sector of Economy 1995 1996 1997
Manufacturing, energy and construction 8.2% 8.4% 2.9%
Agriculture and fishing 9.9% 10.9% 12.8%
Nature protection 1.1% 0.7% 0.3%
Transport, roads and telecommunication 21.6% 15.9% 12.6%
Development of market infrastructure 0.2% 0.1% 0.3%
Housing and utilities 58.0% 63.2% 68.9%
Mass media 0.9% 0.7% 0.8%
Other 0% 0% 1.4%
Source: Calculated from Russian Ministry of Finance data.
characterized as the result of remaining price controls and so-
cial/political factors.19 Although the range of price controls and regula-
tions might be comparable to those observed in Western Europe, the
scale of subsidization (over six percent of GDP or thirty percent of sub-
national budget expenditures) is enormous.
Unlike direct budgetary subsidies (going mostly toward residential utili-
ties, public transportation, and agriculture) the distribution of tolerated
tax arrears exhibits a different pattern (see Table 7). About two thirds of
overdue tax liabilities accumulated at the subnational level by the end of
1997 originate in manufacturing and construction. However, this might
merely reflect the contribution of these two sectors to total tax liabilities.
Table 8 suggests that in all sectors except transportation, compliance on
liabilities owed to subnational budgets is higher than on those owed to
the federal budget. This can be explained by the fact that in all localities
                                               
19 The fact that most of the subsidies support public utilities raises the issue of
enterprise ownership. However, as theory and evidence suggest, "privatizing pub-
lic utilities is primarily about ownership rather than control, as utilities face re-
markably similar regulation under public or private ownership." (Newbery, 1996).
More to the point, Earle and Estrin (1998) present some evidence that "privatiza-
tion and subsidy reduction are substitutes, that privatization and competition are
complements [when the latter is measured as the geographic scope of markets],
and that competition and subsidy reduction are independent, in their impacts on
Russian enterprise productivity." Also Alfandari et al. (1996) found that outsider-
controlled privatized enterprises do better than insider-controlled entities in ex-
tracting subsidies from the Russian government.
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tax payments to all levels of government are collected by a local branch
of the federal tax service, which is de jure independent from subnational
governments and their willingness to tolerate arrears.
































































































Manufacturing 1.69% 0.96% 0.73% 1.45% 0.69% 0.76%
Construction 0.24% 0.11% 0.13% 0.24% 0.10% 0.14%
Transport 0.23% 0.08% 0.15% 0.39% 0.15% 0.25%
Agriculture 0.12% 0.02% 0.09% 0.15% 0.05% 0.10%
Other 0.00% 0.02% –0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Total 2.27% 1.18% 1.09% 2.23% 0.99% 1.24%
Source: Calculated from Russian Ministry of Taxation data











Manufacturing 84.80% 87.04% 84.63% 88.67%
Construction 88.57% 87.15% 86.17% 87.77%
Transport 94.18% 91.54% 94.40% 87.95%
Agriculture 68.87% 61.41% 50.99% 65.20%
Other 99.99% 100.01% 100.00% 100.02%
Total 90.68% 90.73% 89.80% 91.35%
Source: Calculated from Russian Ministry of Taxation data
Higher compliance on liabilities to subnational budgets is also compatible
with the opposite hypothesis of "regional protection" (see Bahl and Wal-
lich, 1995, p. 347; and Shleifer and Treisman, 2000). This line of rea-
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soning dates to the time of "dual leadership," when local finance de-
partments were subordinate both to the turned-independent subnational
governments and to the federal Ministry of Finance. This dual coordina-
tion was eliminated as the federal government established local offices
of the Federal Treasury and Ministry of Taxation to serve federal needs
in every locality. However, the federal servants were recruited mostly
from local finance departments and thus felt competing loyalties. Hence,
the hypothesis of "regional protection" states that federal tax collectors
might be encouraged by local administration to overlook local enter-
prises' liabilities to the federal government.
It is not the aim of this paper to test competing hypotheses explaining
the nature of tax arrears. However, in order to evaluate the impact of fis-
cal decentralization on subsidization, I have to consider possible substi-
tution between direct budgetary subsidies and tax arrears. Alfandari
et al. (1996) argue that tax arrears are very similar to subsidized directed
credits. At the same time the authors find no strong statistical evidence
of a substitution effect between tax arrears and subsidies. They suggest
that government can only be "a passive party in this process." Thus, I
have reasons to believe that tax arrears might serve as implicit subsidi-
zation, but I cannot expect them to be perfect substitutes for direct
budgetary subsidies.
The sectoral distribution of subsidies suggests that there might be some
social, political or even economic reasons for these interventions. In
other words the distortions to market activities caused by subsidization
could be aimed at achieving an economic outcome that is more desir-
able to decision-makers than what would occur otherwise. For example,
a price cap on utilities can theoretically prevent a welfare loss from the
under-consumption of these goods as a result of monopoly pricing. Sub-
sidization of necessities can serve as a cushion against transitory losses
of purchasing power resulting from liberalization of prices. Finally, provi-
sion of goods and services by state-owned enterprises (e.g., public
transportation) below the cost of production can meet some social policy
objectives.
Regardless of the reasons for government interventions, any given form
of implementation is likely to be characterized by a certain degree of in-
efficiency. First, a pursued policy can fail to achieve the desired goals.
For example, one of the declared goals of subsidizing Russian agricul-
ture is to secure domestic production and thus protect the poor, who
cannot afford buying imported foodstuffs. However, because it is done
by subsidizing the inputs to agricultural production (fertilizers, seeds,
fuel, etc.), it might happen that the benefits are reaped by producers or
intermediaries rather than by the intended beneficiaries. Moreover, even
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if subsidization of inputs indeed translates into lower consumer prices, it
benefits all consumers including the non-poor and thus may entail sub-
stantial waste.
Even when social or political benefits of subsidization can be effectively
achieved, they have to be weighted against their economic costs. Fi-
nancing of subsidies brings about market distortions no matter what
form it takes: taxation, public debt, or emission of money. Taxation dis-
torts resource-allocation decisions unless it is done in a lump-sum man-
ner. Accumulation of public debt crowds out private investment and
eventually, as it happened in Russia, can lead to a financial crisis. Infla-
tion creates transaction costs for businesses thus hampering economic
growth.
Besides indirect losses from subsidization related to its fiscal burden, we
also have losses due to the distortion of market activities caused by
subsidies. By diverging prices and production costs, subsidies alter
the incentives of economic agents, and thus can generate rent-seeking
behavior. In transitional economies there is a special form of rent-
seeking that is associated with soft-budget constraints. With so many
enterprises that are not viable in the new market environment, we ob-
serve a unique phenomenon described as the "demise of organizations."
(Kornai, 1998). Facilities that cannot generate any profits, rather than
being shut down, are used for squeezing subsidies out of the govern-
ment. Such activities, although not compatible with maximization of prof-
its, are perfectly rational in the context of some subsidization policies.
Depending on their nature, different means of subsidization might have
different impacts on economic outcomes. As pointed out by Qian and
Roland (1998), subsidies do not present soft budget constraints if enter-
prises do not expect to be bailed out in cases of bad financial perform-
ance. In this case subsidies merely internalize the true social value of
underpriced goods. However, Roland (2000, p. 287) argues that based
on the past record of government-firm relationships in Russia, one can
suspect a strong correlation between the extent of subsidization and the
softness of budget constraints faced by enterprises. Tolerated tax ar-
rears present even stronger evidence of the weak financial discipline
enforced by the government.
The hardness or softness of budget constraints introduced with subsidi-
zation depends on the distribution of bargaining power between the re-
cipient and the government and the ability of both sides to commit them-
selves and to produce credible threats. Segal (1998) shows that a local
monopolist can extract subsidies equal to the welfare loss from discon-
tinued production. That is, the government, when introducing a price
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cap, might be willing to compensate the producer only for the difference
in revenues between the fixed price and the monopoly price. However, if
all the bargaining power is on the producer's side (which is likely to be
the case for a monopoly — consider a giant boiler threatening to cut off
the whole city), the government might have to transfer the total con-
sumer surplus as a subsidy to the producer.
In Russia, the amount of subsidies is determined ex-post, after enter-
prises incurred operating losses attributed to price controls. Needless to
say, under these arrangements, enterprises are discouraged from either
cost containment or revenue mobilization. A typical residential building in
FSU countries "suffers high energy losses and inefficiencies compared
to buildings in Western countries with similar climates" (Martinot, 1997).
It takes proper incentives for housing and utility companies to adopt en-
ergy-saving technologies. Thus, in order to phase out subsidies, local of-
ficials would have to introduce more effective utility regulations based on
performance measures, which require some administrative efforts.
Carrying out the Housing and Utilities Reform, launched in 1990, is still a
daunting task for Russian policy makers. The main goals of the reform
are to eliminate cross-subsidization of one category of consumers by
others, to expand cost recovery, and to challenge the monopoly power
of network utility distributors. Greater cost recovery is pursued both
through cost reduction and sharing cost with final consumers. Cost
sharing implies targeted subsidies to low-income households instead of
transfers to utility companies. While steadily increasing since 1994, as of
1997, cost recovering was still at the level of 40% of actual costs in
housing and utilities (and less than 60% in public transportation).
Even if a firm has no monopoly power and its assets are too obsolete to
be put to any productive use, its mere presence may hamper the devel-
opment of a healthy private sector. As Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994)
argue, such firms "constitute a corrupting influence, perverting the in-
centives and objectives of private entrepreneurs." In addition, by keeping
non-viable companies afloat with subsidies, the state effectively imposes
a fine on productive firms. Moreover, these funds could bring about even
more new businesses if resources were invested into local infrastructure
(roads, telecommunications, human capital, law and order, etc.) instead.
The data presented in this section demonstrate substantial variation
among regions in the degree of subsidization both via direct budgetary
subsidies and tolerated tax arrears. Budgetary subsidies, on average at
6% of the Regional Economic Product, are mostly sector specific and
relate primarily to remaining price regulations, e.g., residential utilities.
Tax arrears with the annual flow on the order of 1% or so of the Regional
Economic Product, are considerably smaller than the flow of direct sub-
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sidies at the subnational level. Moreover, sectoral distribution of tax ar-
rears seems to be driven by different criteria than those for budgetary
subsidies. Unfortunately, a more detailed sectoral breakdown of tax data
showing the amount of tax arrears originating in the sector of residential
utilities is not available. I might have a different picture if I could look at
the distribution of tax exemptions given by local authorities. Different
channels of subsidization can have different justifications and conse-
quences, yet the extent of subsidization can be an informative measure
of the structural reforms in the region.
4. THE MODEL
In this section I develop a model featuring the stylized facts presented in
the previous two sections. My analysis of the model aims at establishing
a link between fiscal decentralization and the propensity of local govern-
ments to subsidize enterprises. From Section 2 we know that local gov-
ernments have no discretion over the fiscal burden borne by the local
economy, as it is entirely determined with the industry mix and the list of
taxes prescribed in federal legislation. Moreover, localities cannot de-
termine autonomously the aggregate size of their budgets, which is a
sum of the local share of tax collections and lump-sum transfers from
the regional government. However, according to Section 3, localities
have some discretion in allocating the available funds between subsidies
to enterprises and more productive uses like local infrastructure.
Subsidies complement price controls by covering operating losses in-
curred by regulated enterprises. Local governments can affect the
amount of the losses/subsidies either by adjusting the price cap or intro-
ducing regulations that stimulate cost reduction (performance measures,
contestability, etc.). Either measure is politically costly and therefore has
to be weighed against the opportunity costs of subsidization, in part de-
termined by intergovernmental fiscal arrangements. Thus my model ex-
amines budgetary responses of local governments to alternations in in-
tergovernmental arrangements.20
The model is based on the interaction between a regional government
and a local government. The regional government determines the
amount of funds available to the local government and allocates the rest
                                               
20 This model was motivated by the seminal paper by Qian and Roland (1998),
who showed that due to fiscal competition among local governments, opportunity
costs of subsidization by localities are higher under fiscal decentralization than in
the case of fiscal centralization.
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to the provision of regional public goods. The local government allocates
public funds to the provision of local infrastructure and subsidization of
inefficient local monopolies. In order to keep the model tractable I have
to introduce a number of simplifying assumptions.
The representative resident of the locality is assumed to derive utility
over consumption of (X, M, GR), where X denotes the consumption level
of a private good (the numéraire), M stands for the consumption level of
the monopoly good (produced by the subsidized sector), and GR stands
for the consumption level of the regional public good. In the interest of
simplicity, the resident's utility function is assumed to be quasi-linear in
X, i.e., ( ) ( )= +, , ,R Ru X M G X u M G , where ( )⋅ ⋅,u  is increasing in both
arguments and strictly concave. The quasi-linear form of the utility func-
tion implies that income effects are captured solely by the consumption
of the private good. Hence, demand for the monopoly good is described
by ( )= ,M Rp u M G  and does not depend on the income level.21
The local economic product Y is produced with two inputs: private capital
K and local infrastructure I. Based on the low mobility of the Russian
population, I assume the number of local residents to be fixed and treat
all variables as being measured per capita. Furthermore, I assume that
capital is perfectly mobile across local boundaries. This implies that, in
equilibrium, ( ) =,KY K I r  (investments are made up to the point where
returns to private capital diminish to some exogenously given level
r  representing the opportunity cost of capital). I also assume that the
local production function Y(K,I) exhibits the following properties:
( ) >, 0IY K I ,
( ) <, 0KKY K I ,
( ) <, 0IIY K I ,
( ) >, 0KIY K I .
                                               
21 Actually, this is true for income greater than some minimum level. Below this
minimum, all income is spent on the consumption of the monopoly good thus de-
termining its consumption level. For income greater than the amount sufficient to
purchase the desired level of the monopoly good as determined by its price, all
extra income is spent on the consumption of the private good. In my stylized
model I assume that the representative resident's income is sufficient to pay the
full cost of the standard level of consumption of the monopoly goods (heating,
water supply, sewage, public transportation and domestic food).
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The last property implies that investment in local infrastructure raises
returns to private capital in the locality.
The local government receives transfers (T) from the regional govern-
ment and retains a portion (λ) of the taxes collected from economic
agents operating in the locality (both businesses and residents). The
revenues are spent on subsidizing the local monopoly and building local
infrastructure. Thus, the local government faces the following budget
constraint:
( ) ( )λτ + = − +,Y K I T c p M I , (1)
where: τ — expresses the general tax burden as a share of the value
added produced in the locality, λ — stands for the rate of allocation of
total tax revenues collected in the locality to the local budget, T — de-
notes budgetary transfers from the regional government to the local
budget, c — stands for the unit cost of the monopoly good provision,
p — is the regulated price of the monopoly good.
The local government's efforts to restructure local monopolies affect the
average costs of the monopoly good production, i.e., ( )= ∈ [ , ]c c e c c ,
where e denotes the level of cost reducing effort, and ′ < 0c . Thus, local
authorities face a trade-off between social welfare and disutility from un-
dertaking restructuring efforts. Social welfare consists of the after-tax
non-capital income less the resident's outlays on the monopoly good
plus the social value of the monopoly and regional public goods. In other
words, the local government's objective function can be expressed as
( ) ( ){ } ( )τ− − − + −1 , , ( )RY K I rK pM u G M v e  (2)
where: u(GR, M) — measures public utility derived from the consumption
of the monopoly and public goods, and v(e) — stands for the local gov-
ernment's disutility from undertaking restructuring efforts.
I assume that a regional government designs an intergovernmental fiscal
scheme ( )λ,T  according to its objectives.22 Given ( )λ,T , the interior
                                               
22 In the empirical literature there is a discussion on the rationality of regional
governments in Russia. For instance Zhuravskaya (2000) found that regional gov-
ernments offset completely changes in localities' own revenues with changes in
transfers. However, Alexeev and Kourlyandskaya (2001) argue that a rational re-
gional government that is averse to transfers would never want to compensate a
locality completely for a fall in local revenues as long as local authorities' efforts
affect local revenues. Using data for localities of one oblast, they find no evidence
that regional transfers tend to completely offset changes in local revenues. They
do find, however, evidence of the ratchet principle in the region-local relationship.
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solution for p, e and I to the local government's optimization problem



























In equation (3) µ is the Lagrange multiplier and denotes the shadow
price of budget resources, that is, the marginal disutility of the local gov-
ernment associated with the marginal reduction of subsidies. Equation
(4) shows that in the optimum, the Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS)
of a price increase for restructuring efforts should be equal to the Tech-
nical Rate of Transformation (TRS) of cost sharing into cost reduction.
Here, the MRS is derived from the local government's objective function
and the TRS is determined with the budget constraint (one ruble of cost
reduction is equivalent in fiscal terms to less than one ruble of a price
increase due to the adjustment of demand).
Equation (5) sets the MRS of local infrastructure for subsidies equal to
the TRS of the first budget allocation into the other. The TRS is less than
one because of the losses due to the outflow of capital. The expression
in square brackets represents the marginal increase in the local tax base
resulting from the marginal increase in the provision of local infrastruc-
ture. It is the sum of the direct impact YI and the indirect effect of capital
inflow.
Now I can derive the comparative statics predictions for the local gov-
ernment's reaction to alterations in intergovernmental fiscal arrange-
ments. Let (p*, e*, I*) denote the local government's optimal solution
and S* = {c(e*) – p*}M(p*) be the resulting amount of subsidies. Then I
can obtain the following results:23
Proposition 1: dS* = γ dλ + δ{τ Y dλ + dT} and γ <0.
This result is an analogue of the so-called "Slutsky equation," which de-
composes the comparative-static derivatives into two components, an
                                               
23 Proofs are given in the Appendix.
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income effect and a substitution effect. The sign of the substitution ef-
fect is derived from the second-order conditions while the income effect
is indeterminate in sign and depends on the curvature of the objective
function. In our case the tax revenue retention rate determines the op-
portunity cost of subsidization and thus affects the substitution of local
infrastructure expenditures for subsidies. The income effect determines
how extra revenues are allocated when the relative merits of different
allocations are not affected.
The result stated in Preposition 1 emphasizes that the outcome of fiscal
decentralization depends on how the decentralized expenditures are fi-
nanced. Let us consider two alternatives: a transfer from the regional
government and a share of tax collections that is ex ante equivalent to
the amount of the transfer (that is, the equivalence is based on a current
fiscal capacity Y, which might become different ex post in part due to
government activities). Then the marginal propensity to spend on subsi-
dies out of transfers is  while the marginal propensity to spend on subsi-






Therefore, a switch from grants to the fixed retention rate of tax collec-
tions results in a smaller amount of subsidies allocated from a fixed size
of the local budget.
Having obtained a prediction concerning the effect of fiscal decentraliza-
tion on the marginal propensity to spend on subsidies, now I turn to the
effects on the average propensity to subsidize. The average propensity
to subsidize is traditionally measured as a ratio of subsidies to either the
























provided that the marginal return to local infrastructure is less than the
average return, that is Π < Y
I
.
To interpret these statements, consider various intergovernmental fiscal ar-
rangements ( )λ,T representing the same level of spending decentralization:
λτY + T = const. Then, higher rates of tax revenue retention λ result in lower
average propensities to subsidize measured as a proportion of either budg-
etary resources or economic product. Overall, the comparative statics
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analysis yields the prediction that due to the substitution effect, the decen-
tralization of the revenue-raising authority reduces subsidization while the in-
come effect of change in available resources is ambiguous.
The findings of my model can be related to the "flypaper effect" discus-
sion, which concerns the taxing decisions of local governments in re-
sponse to the allocation of grants. The "flypaper effect" refers to the
empirical rejection of the "veil hypothesis," stating that for a broad class
of collective-choice procedures, a grant to a community is equivalent to
a set of grants directly given to the residents of that community. This im-
plies that the propensity to spend on local public goods out of the re-
ceived grant should be equal to the propensity to spend on local public
goods out of local residents' income. Thus one should observe a similar
response in local government size to intergovernmental transfers as to
an equivalent increase in local residents' income. However, empirical
studies reveal that local expenditures are much more responsive to an
increase in intergovernmental revenues than they are to an increase in
local residents' income (for a review see Hines and Thaler, 1995).
Hence, the "flypaper effect" — money sticks where it hits.
Although, just like my stylized model, the "flypaper effect" deals with
the budgetary response to intergovernmental transfers, it cannot be
directly applied to the process in my study. In Russia local resi-
dents/governments have no discretion over the rates and bases of taxes
and thus cannot determine autonomously the aggregate size of their
budgets (Bahl and Wallich, 1995, p. 333). Thus, the equivalence be-
tween intergovernmental transfers and local residents' income does not
hold. The only response of localities to a change in intergovernmental
transfers would be a reshuffling across budget allocations. In my stylized
model I have two allocations: local infrastructure and subsidies. I show
that due to a price effect, the propensity to spend on subsidies out of
shared taxes is less than the propensity to spend on subsidies out of
lump-sum grants. However, if government subsidies can to some extent
serve as tax rebates to local taxpayers,24 then my results imply that
shared taxes, which can be interpreted as point-of-collection grants, are
"stickier" than lump-sum grants.
5. EMPIRICAL SUPPORT
In this section, I describe the data, state the research hypothesis derived
from the model of Section 4, and specify an empirical strategy to test
this hypothesis.
                                               
24 I am indebted to Andrew Austin for this point.
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5.1. Structure and Sources of the Data
All available data are annual from 1992 to 1997.
The budgetary data were obtained from Russian Ministry of Finance
sources. In Russia all levels of government use the same centrally in-
troduced budget classification of revenues and expenditures and
submit reports on budget execution to the upper level government on
a regular basis. Expenditures are reported by function, by economic
character, and by spending agency. For every spending agency, ex-
penditures are also classified by object. Thus, for example, I can de-
termine how much a local housing and communal services depart-
ment spent on contracting services (like street cleaning) and how
much was spent on the distribution of subsidies to utilities companies.
The revenue section of the budget reports shows receipts from each
tax allowed by the federal legislation and also gives some information
on non-tax revenues. Receipts from user charges for public services
are not included in budget reports as they are earmarked for and
collected by enterprises under contract for the delivery of these
services. Caution should be taken with regard to budget arrears and
extra-budgetary funds. In Russia, budget execution is reported on a
cash basis, thus excluding receivables and payables accumulated by
the government. Also, as a way to avoid fiscal discipline, some por-
tion of public funds is channeled through extra-budgetary funds.
These funds are formed with budget allocations unspent in the past,
"voluntary" contributions from local enterprises, tax penalties and
other fines, and proceeds from paragovernmental ventures.
Information on tax collections from each region allocated both to the
federal and subnational budgets is taken from Russian Ministry of
Taxation sources. For each region, tax collections are reported by
type of tax, by sector of economy, and by the level of budget that
they are allocated to. Starting from 1994, the stock of tax arrears is
reported by type of tax and by the level of budget it is owed to. In
1997 the stock of tax arrears is also reported for several sectors of
the economy: manufacturing, construction, and trade. Only two
budget levels are distinguished: federal and subnational, with the lat-
ter consolidating figures for the regional budget and the budgets of
localities within that region.
All information on non-fiscal indicators derives from the 1998 Russian
Statistical Yearbook. Information on the variation in the cost of social
services among regions (which accounts for climate, landscape, etc.)
is taken from the calculations of federal assistance to regions.
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5.2. Sample
The new budget classification, based on internationally recognized prin-
ciples, was introduced in Russia only in 1995. The budget classification
in use before 1995 reported expenditures aggregated by sector of econ-
omy as it was done in the Soviet budget system. The data on regional
spending reported to the Russian Ministry of Finance before 1995 does
not allow one to classify expenditures by object (Freinkman and Haney,
1997). Hence, in my analysis I will focus on the period 1995 – 1997 to
avoid problems of data inconsistencies.
I have budgetary data for all eighty-eight subjects of the Russian Fed-
eration excluding Chechnya. However, those indicators that are defined
as a proportion of the regional economic product cannot be computed
for nine autonomous areas and seven oblasts within whose boundaries
these autonomous areas are located. The reason is that official statistics
report economic product produced within the boundaries of a whole
oblast thus making it impossible to split the product between independ-
ent regions located one inside another. Therefore for my regressions the
sample is narrowed to 72 regions over 3 years.
5.3. An Empirical Version of the Theoretical Predictions
The theoretical model presented in Section 4 predicts that the amount of
local subsidies is affected by fiscal incentives introduced with tax-sharing
and the decentralization of budgetary resources. Let i index regions, and
let j index individual localities within those regions. Then, a discrete time
version of Proposition 1 can be written as
τ
γ λ δ λ ε
  ∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +   











is the change in the per capita amount of subsidies in locality j since pe-
riod 0; λ λ λ∆ = − 0ijt ijt ij  is the change in the tax revenue retention rate for
locality j since period 0;
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denotes the per capita amount of total tax collections in locality j in pe-
riod 0;




is the change in the per capita amount of transfers to locality j since pe-
riod 0; εijt is the error due to approximation.
Proposition 1 leads us to the following Hypothesis 1: γ < 0.
5.4. Measures of Decentralization and Issues of Aggregation
Unfortunately, my data do not allow me to estimate equation (6) at the
level of individual localities. Available figures for local budgets are aggre-
gated at the regional level. Thus, I don't have data on tax revenue reten-
tion rates for individual localities but the aggregated share of local gov-















Hence I will employ region-level data as proxies for equation (6) vari-
ables aggregated across localities. The equation to be estimated has the
following form:
( ) ( )γ λ λ δ χ α β ε− = − + − + + + +0 0 0 itit i it i it i it i ts s d d X . (7)
where: its is the per capita amount of subsidies25 in region i in period t;
λit is the aggregated share of local governments in consolidated tax col-
lections26 in region i in period t; itd  is the period 0 projection of local per
capita revenues for period t in region i, that is, the total per capita tax
collections in period 0 times the tax revenue retention rate set for period
                                               
25 Region-level data include subsidies allocated by the regional government in
addition to those allocated by local governments. This contributes to the meas-
urement error of the dependent variable.
26 In the hypothetical case of a region having only one locality, this measure is
equivalent to the rate of allocation of total tax revenues collected in the locality to
the local budget. In a general case, this measure can serve as a proxy for the
average rate of allocation of total tax revenues collected in localities to local
budgets.
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t plus the amount of lump-sum grants set for period t; Xit is a vector of
variables controlling for other determinants of subsidization; αi and βt are
region- and year-specific effects; ε it  is a random error term.
Hypothesis 1 can be rejected at the significance level  if my panel data
analysis yields a positive t-ratio γ
!
t  for coefficient γ such that
( )χ θ> <!Pr ob t t .
5.5. Endogeneity Problem
Intergovernmental arrangements that one observes in Russian regions is
a result of factors that affect the decentralization of authority by regional
governments and factors that affect local demand for fiscal resources.
To study the effects of decentralization, I have to rely exclusively on the
variation in decentralization that comes from the regional government's
decisions. Indeed, factors that affect local governments' demand for
budgetary resources can also have a direct effect on the extent of sub-
sidization. For instance, localities that inherited more wasteful enterprises
can make a stronger claim for budgetary resources. Thus endogeneity
will bias the estimates of the effect of decentralization on the propensity
to subsidize. The best response to this problem is a set of valid instru-
ments — that is, variables that affect intra-regional decentralization but
are uncorrelated with the factors that affect subsidization. Potential in-
struments are derived from Timofeev (2001), where cross-regional varia-
tion in subnational decentralization is explained with exogenous variables
capturing the initial level of decentralization, urban concentration, land
area, population density, ethnic diversity, natural resources endowment,
and others.
5.6. Control variables
I would expect that my stylized model omits some region- and time-
specific factors that affect local governments' budget allocations. Exist-
ing empiric studies on budgetary subsidies in Russia identify supply- and
demand-side factors.27 Supply-side variables characterize the availability
of budgetary resources and the presence of competing fiscal pressures
(i.e., for allocations other than subsidies). Demand-side variables ex-
press the need for subsidies on the part of enterprises.
                                               
27 See Alfandari et al., 1996; Freinkman and Haney, 1997; Martinez-Vazquez and
Boex, 2001; Orlov et al., 2000; and Titov, 1997.
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On the demand side the studies quote the provision of social services by
enterprises (+), drops in exports (+), labor productivity (–), the percent
of rural population (+), and the share of defense production (+) as sig-
nificant determinants of subsidization. On the supply side, according to
these studies, the determinants include per capita GRP (+), regions' own
per capita budgetary revenues (+), per capita federal transfers (+),
household income (+), life expectancy (+), population under working age
(–), and doctors per 10,000 population (–). In addition, Orlov et al.
(2000) find the regional political environment (measured as a percentage
of votes cast for the communist party) to affect the extent of subsidiza-
tion in the region.
Some of the above listed factors are endogenous to my model as the fi-
nancial shape of enterprises is determined by local governments' re-
structuring efforts. Thus I will not be able to distinguish statistically be-
tween the impact of decentralization and that of the financial distress of
enterprises. However, I can control for exogenously determined factors
such as industry-wide shocks. For every region I compute an index of
"healthy" sectors as a weighted sum of national indexes of sectoral pro-
duction with each sector having a weight proportional to its share in the
regional economy. On the supply side I can control for the initial level of
GRP (in 1994) and for competing fiscal pressures as determined by the
share of population over and under the working age, which requires
more spending on healthcare and education.
Some part of the variation in the subsidization of social services can be
explained with fundamental cost differentials across regions. Obviously,
for the same level of cost-reducing efforts it takes more energy to heat a
residential building in Siberia than to heat one on the Black Sea shore.
To control for these factors I include region-level indexes of production
costs in housing and utilities and transportation.
6. ESTIMATION RESULTS
Table 9 provides descriptive statistics calculated over the sample of obser-
vations pooled across regions and years. There is a wide variation in both
the measures of fiscal decentralization that occurred since 1992. Change
in the tax revenue retention rate has a mean of –1.5 percentage points
and a standard deviation of 9.4 percentage points. Change in local reve-
nues from tax-sharing and lump sum grants has a mean of –315 constant
1992 rubles per capita and a standard deviation of 5,217. Table 10 pro-
vides coefficients of pair-wise correlation for selected variables. The cor-
relation between the two measures of decentralization is –0.01. The lack
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of correlation is important for distinguishing between the substitution and
income effects of tax sharing as predicted in the theoretic model.
Table 9. Descriptive Statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Max Min
Change in tax revenue retention rate
since 1992
–0.015 0.094 0.224 –0.299
Decentralization of resources,
thou. RUR per capita since 1992
–0.315 5.217 48.870 –20.275
Tax revenue retention rate in 1992
(share)
0.448 0.153 0.668 0.000
Population density
(thou. persons/km2)
0.198 1.086 8.770 0.0001
Land area (millions of km2) 0.151 0.380 3.103 0.009
"Healthy" Sectors Index 0.861 0.050 1.026 0.735
Housing & Utilities Costs Index 1.122 0.507 2.845 0.754
Transportation Costs Index 1.460 1.324 10.481 1.000
GRP, millions RUR per capita in 1994 3.140 1.361 8.080 0.752
Population under working age (%) 23.239 3.559 35.800 17.700
Population over working age (%) 19.774 4.734 27.300 5.300
Change in the amount of subsidies
(thou. RUR per capita)
–3.237 5.221 12.795 –42.420
Change in per capita amount of tax
arrears (thou. RUR per capita)
0.798 0.908 6.231 –0.758
Change in a sum
of per capita amounts
of subsidies and tax arrears
(thou. RUR per capita)
–2.440 5.317 17.939 –41.357
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Table 10. Pair-wise correlation coefficients.
Change in tax revenue
retention rate
Decentralization of resources –0.010
Change in the amount
of subsidies
Change in tax revenue
retention rate
–0.252
Change in per capita amount
of tax arrears
Change in tax revenue
retention rate
0.140
Change in the sum of per
capita amounts of subsidies
and tax arrears
Change in tax revenue
retention rate
–0.223
Change in the amount
of subsidies
Decentralization of resources 0.226
Change in per capita
amount of tax arrears
Decentralization of resources 0.322
Change in the sum of per
capita amounts of subsidies
and tax arrears
Decentralization of resources 0.277
6.1. First-Stage Results
Table 11 contains the estimates of the first-stage regressions for the two
measures of decentralization. Both aspects of decentralization are statis-
tically significantly related to the four variables excluded from the sub-
sidization equation: the initial rate of tax revenue retention in 1992, the
share of the largest ethnic minority in the total population, population
density, and land area. The F-statistic on the joint significance of the four
excluded instruments is 22.176 (the p-value is less than 0.001) for the
change in the tax revenue retention rate and 3.698 (the p-value is less
than 0.007) for the decentralization of budgetary resources. This sug-
gests that the second-stage estimates shouldn't have biases resulting
from weakly correlated instrumental variables (Bound et al, 1995).
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS38
Table 11. First-Stage Regressions: Parameters and Robust Standard Errors.
Dependent variable




















































F4, 203 —statistic, joint significance
for the excluded instruments
22.176 3.698
Sample size 216 216
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.28
Notes: All models include year effects.
* — statistically significant at the 10% level;
** — statistically significant at the 5% level;
*** — statistically significant at the 1% level.
6.2. The Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on Subsidies
First column of Table 12 shows Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS)
estimates of equation 7) for one measure of subsidization: per capita
budgetary subsidies in constant 1992 rubles. Period 0 is set to be
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1992. The effect of a change in the tax revenue retention rate on the
proliferation of subsidies is negative and significant at the 10%-level. A









rubles of reduction in subsidies. The effect of decentralization of budget
resources is positive and significant at the 1%-level. An extra ruble made
available to a local government either via shared taxes or lump sum
grants results in a 2.78 ruble increase in subsidies. Thus, a marginal
propensity to subsidize out of retained taxes is 2.78 – 2.40 = 0.38.
Table 12. Effects of Decentralization on Budgetary Subsidies.































































216*R2 (distributed χ2 d.f. = 2)
1.753
Sample size 216 216 216
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.89
Notes: All specifications include year effects. Standard errors are provided in parenthesis
* — statistically significant at the 10% level;
** — statistically significant at the 5% level;
*** — statistically significant at the 1% level.
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In addition to the estimates of the effect of decentralization, Table 12
also shows coefficients for other covariates. I find the negative effects of
growing sectors and of the 1994 level of Gross Regional Product on an
increase in subsidies. Thus, these two variables characterize the demand
for subsidies on the part of enterprises. The coefficient for the housing
and utilities costs index is positive at the 5% significance level. The costs
in transportation have a negative but statistically insignificant effect. The
shares of the population under and over the working age have negative
but statistically insignificant effects.
The last row of Table 12 presents results for the omnibus test of overi-
dentification. This test attempts to show that variation in the four ex-
cluded instruments is not correlated with subsidization. Technically, it is a
test of whether, after eliminating its correlation with fiscal decentraliza-
tion and other covariates, subsidization is still correlated with the initial
rate of tax revenue retention, the share of the largest ethnic minority,
population density, and land area. The test statistic is distributed as χ2
with two degrees of freedom (the number of excluded instruments minus
the number of endogenous variables). The omnibus test fails to reject
the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments affect subsidization
only via their effects on intra-regional decentralization.
I also run a Hausman test that checks the validity of potential instruments
based on the availability of as many true instruments as the number of
endogenous variables. The test statistic is distributed as χ2 with one de-
gree of freedom. I tested the validity of each instrument assuming exo-
geneity of any two of the remaining three. The largest value of the static
that I obtained is 2.9, which is below the 5% critical value of 3.8. Thus, if
at least two of the excluded variables are valid instruments, then the
Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis that the remaining two
instruments are also legitimate.
The last two columns of Table 12 report the estimates for two alternative
specifications of the regression analysis. The middle column shows the
estimates for the year-effects specification assuming the decentralization
variables to be exogenous. The fixed- and random-effects estimates are
very close, therefore the Hausman test favors random effects (presented
in the table). The last column reports two-way-fixed-effect estimates.
This specification excludes time-invariant covariates as their effects are
captured by the region dummies. Both alternative specifications produce
the same signs for the impact of decentralization as 2SLS does. How-
ever, the magnitude of these effects is much smaller and turns out to be
insignificant for the decentralization of budgetary resources in the two-
way fixed-effect specification.
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Overall, Table 12 demonstrates that a switch from lump-sum grants to
tax revenue retention has a statistically significant, negative effect on the
amount of budgetary subsidies. Assuming intra-regional decentralization
to be exogenous is likely to produce biased estimates of its impact on
subsidization. The initial rate of tax revenue retention, the share of the
largest ethnic minority, density of population, and land area appear to be
valid instruments.
6.3. Alternative Measures of Subsidization
Section 3 reveals that explicit budgetary subsidies do not account for the
whole subsidization. There are more implicit forms like tax benefits, pref-
erential credits, tax exemptions, tax offsets, and tolerated tax arrears. I
have data for the stock of tax arrears in 1994 – 1997. Thus I can calcu-
late the annual flow of tax arrears in 1995 – 1997. Unfortunately, I do not
have data on the flow of tax arrears before the decentralization began in
1992. However, knowing that the development of implicit subsidization
mostly occurred after 1993, I can assume the flow of tax arrears to be
zero in 1992.
Table 13 reports the estimates of the effects of fiscal decentralization on
alternative forms of subsidization. The signs of the estimates are con-
sistent for different econometric specifications and dependent variables.
The estimated coefficients for the effects of fiscal decentralization on
budgetary subsidies and tax arrears sum up to the estimated coefficient
for the effects of fiscal decentralization on the sum of these two forms of
subsidization. Thus, budgetary subsidies and tax arrears appear to be
complementary forms of subsidization. The results support the hypothe-
sis that increasing tax revenue retention lowers local governments' pro-
pensity to subsidize enterprises for any given level of decentralization of
resources. None of the specifications can reject this hypothesis at the
30%-significance level.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The main objective of this research was to provide some theory and evi-
dence on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and the pro-
pensity of subnational governments to subsidize enterprises. In a stylized
model of interaction between regional and local governments, I have
demonstrated how intergovernmental fiscal arrangements affect local
governments' propensity to subsidize inefficient monopolies. The model
predicts that higher rates of tax revenue retention by local governments
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TR2 (distributed χ2 d.f. = 2)
1.753 1.875 1.376
Sample size 216 216 216
Notes: All specifications include year effects.
Standard errors are provided in parenthesis
* — statistically significant at the 10% level;
** — statistically significant at the 5% level;
*** — statistically significant at the 1% level.
raise their opportunity costs of subsidizing enterprises. Thus, such higher
rates make local governments reallocate public funds to infrastructure
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provision instead. At the same time, the effect of decentralizing budget-
ary resources solely depends on the curvature of residents' and local
governments' utility functions. These theoretic predictions are in agree-
ment with the results of my empirical analysis of a panel of 72 Russian
regions over the period 1995 – 1997.
This empirical examination is highly relevant for current policy debates
on the decentralization of revenue raising authority within Russian re-
gions and the assignment of expenditure responsibilities between the
two subnational levels of government. The presented findings suggest
that decentralization of expenditures can result in more efficient budget
allocations only if accompanied by the decentralization of revenue raising
authority.
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THE PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS
Proposition 1: dS* = γ dλ + δ{τ Y dλ + dT} and γ <0.
Proof:
Implicitly differentiating the first-order condition for each choice variable
and solving simultaneously, I obtain









H  — denotes the bordered Hessian determinant,
44H  — stands for the upper-left minor of the bordered Hessian matrix,
41H  — stands for the upper-right minor of the bordered Hessian matrix,
Π — stands for the marginal increase in local economic product resulting










Taking the total differential of the local government's budget constraint
(1) yields dS* = γ dλ + δ{τ Y dλ + dT}. Substituting (8) for dI* and rear-
ranging gives
( ) ( ) { }λτ τ λ λ τ τ λ
 
′  
= Π − Π + − Π − + ′   
44 41
* 1 1 1
H Hv
dS d Yd dT
McH H
.
The second order conditions imply28 that
< 0H  and >44 0H .
                                               
28 This is valid only in the case of a regular maximum, that is if the Hessian matrix
is negative definite subject to the constraint, which is a common assumption.
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provided that the marginal return to local infrastructure is less than the





Taking the total differential of the local government's budget constraint
(1) yields
( )
( ) ( ) ( ){ }λτ τ λλτ λτ
∗
∗ ∗ ∗
−  = Π − − + + + + 2
1c p M
d I Y T dI I Yd dT
Y T Y T
,
where Π  stands for the marginal increase in the local tax base re-
sulting from a marginal increase in the local infrastructure provision









Substituting from the expression for dI* from Equation (8) and assuming
τ λ + = 0Yd dT results in






















′ = Π − − Π <  ′+
By analogy we obtain the result for the propensity to subsidize, meas-
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